

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 IO-10 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

ACDA-05 BIB-01 SAB-01 EB-07 /098 W

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R 231415Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7952

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USNATO 730

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRAGUE 916

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR SHERER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, DA, CZ

SUBJECT: BRIEFING BY DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSEN

1. APRIL 23 DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDERSEN GAVE FORTY--
MINUTE BRIEFING TO NATO AMBASSADORS ON HIS VISIT TO PRAGUE.
MAIN ITEMS ANDERSEN DISCUSSED WERE CSCE, UN, KEKKONEN PLAN,
WESTERN SUMMITS, AND THE DUBCEK LETTER. GENERALLY SPEAKING,
ANDERSEN SAID, THE VISIT WAS DEVOID OF SURPRISES. AS FOR
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CSCE, AFTER HIS TALKS HERE, ANDERSEN SAID DANES WERE "NOT

LESS CONFIDENT" THAN THEY HAD BEEN BEFORE. IN THE SHORT TIME HIS SCHEDULE ALLOWED, ANDERSEN DID NOT OFFER ANY COMMENTS ON BILATERAL MATTERS, EXCEPT THE INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES IN INCREASING TRADE.

2. CSCE. IN A VISIT DEVOID OF SURPRISES, ANDERSEN SAID, CSCE HAD BEEN A PRINCIPAL SUBJECT. HE SPENT A GOOD DEAL OF TIME EXPLAINING HIS POSITION ON THE "DANISH PROPOSAL," EMPHASIZING THAT DENMARK WAS NOT TRYING TO PREVENT MEETINGS AFTER CSCE, BUT WAS SAYING THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE BILATERALLY, AS A FIRST PRIORITY, ONCE CSCE WAS CONCLUDED. ON BASKET III, ANDERSEN SAID HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS CONCRETE DEEDS THE DANES WANTED, NOT MERELY AGREED STATEMENTS. WITHOUT BEING ASKED, PRIME MINISTER STROUGAL MADE STATEMENT THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS READY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WHATEVER WAS AGREED ON IN BASKET III. ON PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS, ANDERSEN SAID HE MENTIONED THIS BRIEFLY AND STROUGAL MERELY COMMENTED THAT THEY CONSIDERED THIS MATTER MORE OR LESS SOLVED. ASKED IF THE CZECHS PRESSED HIM REGARDING THE FOLLOW-UP QUESTION, ANDERSEN SAID NO. STROUGAL SAID CZECHS DID NOT SEE THIS CONFERENCE AS LAST ONE, AND ANDERSEN AGREED WITH THIS, BUT THEY DID NOT DISCUSS PERIODICITY IN DETAIL. WITH REGARD TO SIGNING OF DOCUMENTS, CZECHS MENTIONED SIGNING DIFFERENT SETS OF DOCUMENTS, BUT ANDERSEN INSISTED, HE SAID, ON ONE SIGNING OF ONE DOCUMENT. ASKED ABOUT TERMINAL DATE, ANDERSEN SAID CZECHS DID NOT MENTION JUNE 30TH; THEY MENTIONED "JUNE OR JULY" IN PASSING, BUT WITHOUT ANY STRESS. (ANDERSEN NOTED THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN COPENHAGEN HAD RECENTLY SPOKEN OF A TERMINAL DATE IN "JULY OR SEPTEMBER," WHICH WAS FIRST TIME HE HAD HEARD SOVIETS USE SEPTEMBER EXPLICITLY AS POSSIBILITY.)

3. SUMMITS. PARENTHETICALLY, ANDERSEN SPELLED OUT DANISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS SUMMIT MEETINGS, WHICH HE SAID DANES HAD EXPRESSED AT PREVIOUS EEC MEETINGS AND AT NATO. THEY DID NOT FAVOR A NATO OR EEC) SUMMIT JUST PRIOR TO THE HELSINKI CEREMONY CLOSING CSCE, BECAUSE THIS WOULD IMPLY A CERTAIN EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION OR BLOC-TO-BLOC APPROACH. THEY DID AGREE 100 PERCENT WITH THE PROPOSAL FOR A JUNE NATO HIGH-LEVEL MEETING AND TRUSTED THAT THIS WOULD COME ABOUT. (THIS CONFIDENTIAL

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WAS OF COURSE NOT DISCUSSED WITH THE CZECHS.)

4. UN. ANDERSEN SAID MUCH DISCUSSION WAS DEVOTED TO UN MATTERS. HE SAID HE HAD STRESSED THE DANISH POSITION IN FAVOR OF UNIVERSALITY. THUS HE HAD EXPLAINED WHY DENMARK, DESPITE ITS WELL-KNOWN POSITION TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA, HAD NOT VOTED FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S EXCLUSION LAST YEAR. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE POINTED OUT TO THE CZECHS THAT DENMARK WOULD

BE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO NAY EFFORT TO READ ISRAEL OUT, AND WOULD FIGHT AGAINST THIS. BY SAME TOKEN, DENMARK DEPLORED POLITICIZATION IN SPECIALIZED AGENCIES. FINALLY, IN RESPONSE TO STROUGAL'S QUESTION, ANDERSEN SAID HE TOLD HIM THAT DENMARK DEFINITELY WAS FOR STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY COUNCIL, NOT FOR WEAKENING IT.

5. DUBCEK LETTER. ANDERSEN SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THE DUBCEK LETTER SEVERAL TIMES WITH CHNOUPEK AND STROUGAL AND STROUGAL MENTIONED TO HIM THAT HE HAD TOLD HUSAK ABOUT THEIR DISCUSSION. ANDERSEN SAID THE MATTER WAS DISCUSSED IN A FAIRLY NORMAL MANNER WITH NO EMBARRASSMENT ON CZECH SIDE; BUT HE DID GIVE IMPRESSION THAT CONVERSATION DEALT IN GOOD PART WITH PALME-HUSAK EXCHANGE, PERHAPS STAYING AWAY FROM MORE SENSITIVE ISSUES SUCH AS HUSAK'S RELATIONSHIP WITH RESIDUES OF 1968. ANDERSEN SAID NEITHER STROUGAL NOR CHNOUPEK COMPLAINED TO HIM ABOUT THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE MATTER IN THE WEST. CHNOUPEK DISCUSSED IT AS AN ISOLATED MATTER, NOT IN CONNECTION WITH EAST-WEST POLICY OR ANY OTHER SUBJECTS. ANDERSEN SAID HE ASKED CHNOUPEK WHO HELPED DUBCEK GET HIS LETTER ABROAD, THOSE INSIDE OR THOSE OUTSIDE, AND CHNOUPEK SAID "THOSE INSIDE." MAIN PART OF ANDERSEN'S BRIEFING ON THIS TOPIC WAS CONNECTED WITH PALME. HE WAS CLOSE TO BEING OPENLY CRITICAL OF PALME, SAYING "AS FOR MYSELF, I AM NOT SURPRISED THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS NOT DEMOCRATIC," AND WONDERING WHY PALME DID NOT CRITICIZE ALL THE MANY UNDEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. HE LEFT IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS NOT SUPPORTER OF PALME IN THIS MATTER, AND PERHAPS IN OTHERS AS WELL.

6. KEKKONEN PLAN. THE CZECHS RAISED THE KEKKONEN PLAN, ANDERSEN SAID, AND A FAIR AMOUNT OF TIME WAS DEVOTED TO IT. ANDERSEN SAID HE SPOKE OUT RATHER FRANKLY ON THIS MATTER, CONFIDENTIAL

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TELLING THE CZECHS THAT DENMARK REALLY CONSIDERED THIS AN INTERNAL FINNISH MATTER. TO NATO AMBASSADORS, ANDERSEN SAID HE BELIEVED STROUGAL RAISED THE SUBJECT BECAUSE PODGORNÝ IN HIS RECENT VISIT TO HELSINKI HAD REACTIVATED THE MATTER-- FOR SOME REASON IT SEEMS THE SOVIETS AND/OR THE FINNS CONSIDER IT SUEFUL FOR HELSINKI TO RESURRECT THE IDEA FROM TIME TO TIME. (ANDERSEN SAID HE EXPECTED TO HEAR SAME LINE IN BUDAPEST NEXT WEEK.) AS FOR DENMARK -- AND, HE THOUGHT, THE OTHER SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES -- IT FELT THAT KEKKONEN NEEDED THIS MATTER FOR INTERNAL REASONS, AND THAT IT DID NOT MAKE MUCH SENSE AS FOREIGN POLICY. DENMARK SAW NO UTILITY IN THE PROPOSAL -- IT WAS ALL RIGHT TO EXAMINE THE IDEA IN THE UN, BUT THE PROPOSAL ITSELF HAD LITTLE TO OFFER. (THE GREEK AMBASSADOR ASKED IF STROUGAL HAD GONE ON TO MENTION THE "MEDITERRANEAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE," WHICH DEPUTY FONMIN RUZEK

HAD ONCE LINKED TO KEKKONEN PLAN IN CONVERSATION WITH HIM. ANDERSEN SAID CZECHS DID NOT MENTION THIS WITH HIM.)

7. TRADE. ANDERSEN SAID HE TOLD THE CZECHS THERE WAS TOO LITTLE TRADE AND IT SHOULD GO UP, AND CZECHS AGREED. ONLY INTERESTING THING HERE, TO ANDERSEN, WAS THAT WITHOUT BEING ASKED A QUESTION, STROUGAL VOLUNTEERED THE STATEMENT THAT THE COMMON MARKET "WAS NO HINDRANCE." ANDERSEN SAID HE FOUND THIS POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EEC OF SOME INTEREST, PARTICULARLY THAT IT WAS SAID WITHOUT THE DANES RAISING THE SUBJECT.

8. OTHER SUBJECTS. ANDERSEN SAID HE DID NOT GO INTO ANY DETAILS OR MBFR, MERELY STATING THE DANISH POSITION THAT THERE MUST NOT BE ANY IMBALANCE IN THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW, HE SAID, IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST. ON CYPRUS, DISCUSSION WAS KEPT BRIEF, FOR THEY WERE LOOKING TO THE VIENNA TALKS. ANDERSEN SAID DANES TALKED CZECHS INTO HAVING NO COMMUNIQUE. THERE WOULD BE A BRIEF STATEMENT TO THE PRESS ALONG STANDARD LINES WITH MAIN MENTION OF CSCE AND TRADE.

9. ANDERSEN SPENT MUCH TIME WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CHNOUPEK, BUT SPOKE PRIMARILY OF HIS TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER STROUGAL. ANDERSEN'S PRINCIPAL AIDE (BIERING) TOLD CHARGE THAT STROUGAL WAS VERY WELL BRIEFED ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FIRM -- EVEN CONFIDENTIAL

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COCKY -- IN HIS GENERAL ATTITUDE.
PERRY

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